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Abstract
How might a large jurisdiction approach carbon neutrality by 2050, and what initiatives might increase the chances of
success? This article explores these questions using California as a case study. Current trends as well as multiple modeling
studies show that existing policy directions for the state will not be sufficient. Additional initiatives appear needed to accel-
erate adoption of electric vehicles, reduce driving, reach 100 percent renewable electricity, convert existing buildings to
zero-net-carbon status, change diet, and reduce consumption. The state’s social ecology does not currently support such
changes. Consequently, planners and other professionals need to consider strategic actions to change social ecology as
well as climate policy. Potential steps to do this include raising the price of carbon; revising the state’s tax system so as to
increase public sector capacity; developing a stronger framework of incentives, mandates, and technical support between
levels of government; and expanding educational and social marketing programs aimed at behavior change. A main impli-
cation of this analysis is that in many contexts worldwide sustainability planners should consider action on both policy and
social ecology levels to maximize chances of success.
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1. Introduction
Jurisdictions worldwide face the challenge of moving
towards carbon neutrality, among other sustainability
needs. How can planners and other professionals best
help them do this? This article explores this question,
using California’s climate mitigation planning as a case
study. The argument developed here is that new, more
explicit attention to shaping social ecologies in construc-
tive directions is needed in order to enable stronger state
climate planning as well as the regional, local, corporate,
and individual actions that together will be required to
reach carbon neutrality.
For an American state with annual greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions averaging 35 metric tons CO2e1 per
household to reach carbon neutrality by mid-century
would seem next-to-impossible. (By carbon neutrality
I mean a condition of no net global warming emissions
when life cycle impacts of production and consump-
tion are considered.)2 Capitalist economics, consump-
tive lifestyles, elite-driven politics, and institutional in-
adequacies are daunting obstacles to ending GHG emis-
sions. Large petroleum exploration and refining indus-
tries would need to be shut down,motor vehicle use and
air travel dramatically reduced, diets changed, and many
other lifestyle changes brought about.
1 CO2-equivalent; i.e. all global warming emissions measured in terms of CO2.
2 Preferably emitters would not be allowed to purchase emissions offsets which promise to reduce GHGs emitted elsewhere. Major problems exist in
verifying that such offsets really occur, that they wouldn’t have been done anyway, that they are permanent, and that they didn’t lead in turn to other
emissions. However, offsets that produced verifiable carbon reduction within California might be desirable if used only to offset unavoidable emissions
such as those embodied within otherwise zero-net-energy vehicles and buildings.
Urban Planning, 2017, Volume 2, Issue 4, Pages 5–18 5
However, the State of California has already made
substantial progress toward reducing its GHG emissions
through actions starting in 2005. The state is likely to
meet its initial target of reducing 2020 emissions to 1990
levels, approximately a 20 percent reduction from the
peak in 2007 (California Air Resources Board [CARB],
2017). In 2016 the legislature and governor embraced a
new goal of reducing emissions 40 percent below 1990
by 2030. The eventual aim is 80 percent below 1990
levels by 2050. So despite the difficulty of moving to-
ward carbon neutrality, California has embarked upon an
ambitious program to achieve it. With the sixth largest
economy in the world, California’s success or failure
in this effort will have lessons for many other jurisdic-
tions worldwide.
This article takes a unique perspective on climate
mitigation planning by asking not only what additional
policy initiatives might be needed for carbon neutral-
ity, but what fundamental steps to shape the state’s
social ecology might maximize the chances of success.
Such an analysis has not been attempted before and is
admittedly exploratory and broad-brush. Many events
over a 30-year period are unpredictable. However, other
important trends can be foreseen with reasonable cer-
tainty. Future demographic changes in the state are rela-
tively predictable, institutions of state government have
well-known strengths and weaknesses, and many politi-
cal forces, values, and lifestyles are relatively stable. We
have more than a decade of data on the state’s current
climate policies, and several modeling groups agree on
the necessity of new steps to reduce emissions (e.g. Yeh
et al., 2016). So support can be found for this large scale
of analysis, which on both climate policy and social ecol-
ogy levels can suggest near-term steps to increase the
likelihood of long-term climate planning success.
2. Social Ecology
A starting point here is the assumption that a jurisdic-
tion’s policy options and its social ecology evolve hand-
in-hand. “Social ecology” as used here refers to inter-
woven human systems co-evolving under the influence
of environmental, social, cultural, economic, technolog-
ical, institutional, political, racial, gender, and cognitive
factors. Over the past two centuries many social sci-
entists have theorized various versions of social evolu-
tion, including Spencer (1864/2002), Marx (1867), the
Chicago School of urban sociology in the early 20th
century (e.g. McKenzie, Park, and Burgess, 1925/1967),
Bookchin (1982), Bateson (1972), and Norgaard (1994).
This sort of systemic, holistic analysis is particularly
called for when contemplating strategies for sustain-
able development, whichmust cross disciplines and time
scales while meeting environmental, economic, and so-
cial goals (Wheeler, 2013).
Another historical foundation for social ecology has
been public health. Bronfenbrenner (1977) was among
the first to emphasize that the individual should be
seen as embedded within interpersonal influences (the
family, peers, local networks), organizational influences
(schools, churches, workplaces), broader community
structures, and large-scale policy frameworks. Stokols
(1992) emphasized the dynamic relations between el-
ements of these systems, writing that “Social ecologi-
cal analyses incorporate a variety of concepts derived
from systems theory (e.g., interdependence, homeosta-
sis, negative feedback, deviation amplification) to un-
derstand the dynamic relations between people and
their environments.”
Other contemporary disciplines such as political ecol-
ogy, environmental history, natural resource manage-
ment, and resilience theory take a similarly social eco-
logical view, but unlike public health do not place the
individual at the core. Ostrom, for example, comments
that “All humanly used resources are embedded in com-
plex, social-ecological systems (SESs)…composed of mul-
tiple subsystems and internal variables within these
subsystems at multiple levels analogous to organisms
composed of organs, organs of tissues, tissues of cells,
cells of proteins, etc.” (2009, p. 419). Writers such as
Fabinyi, Evans and Foale (2014) within the growing
field of resilience science emphasize factors of social
diversity, institutions, power, and values within social-
ecological systems.
Despite this widespread interest in “social ecology,”
there is still no well-accepted contemporary framework
with which to employ it. Hence in this article I’ve tried to
flesh out the concept. As illustrated by Ostrom’s quote,
social ecological systems can be very complex. A main
question is how to conceptualize them simply so that
multiple audiences can understand important elements
of these systems. One graphic depiction of how socio-
ecological factors interrelate from a social science point
of view is shown in Figure 1. This graphic is intended
to illustrate the dynamic nature of what Norgaard and
others have termed “co-evolution.” It is necessarily a sim-
plification; in the text of his book Norgaard conducts a
far more wide-ranging exploration of topics related to
international development than represented by Figure 1
(Norgaard, 1994).
Values
Knowledge Organizaon
Environment Technology
Figure 1. Norgaard’s diagram of co-evolutionary factors.
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To consider social ecological forces within a state
such as California, I would like to cast a somewhat
broader net as shown by Figure 2, adding several impor-
tant dimensions while trying to keep the overall num-
ber of variables limited. In putting forth such a graphic
as a basis for analysis, I don’t want to imply that peo-
ple haven’t thought about how many of these dimen-
sions, separately or in combination, relate to climate
planning. Instead I want to suggest that a systematic ap-
proach to socio-ecological analysis can be useful, and
that these are some of the most important dimensions
to be considered.
Wemay define the components of Figure 2 in the fol-
lowing ways:
• Ideology: Any overarching belief system or world-
view
• Cognition: An individual’s mental processes of un-
derstanding
• Behavior: Individual or collective actions, including
patterns of consumption and lifestyle
• Politics: Systems of power, in particular through
elected office and political parties
• Institutions: Social structures including laws, orga-
nizations, and channels of communication
• Economics: Systems of production and exchange
• Technology: Techniques, skills, methods, and ma-
chines to achieve particular purposes
• Environment: The physical context, including eco-
logical systems and human-created settings
• Class: Systems of inequality based on wealth
• Race: Systems of inequality based on physical
traits and ancestry
• Gender: Characteristics related to masculinity and
femininity
• Values: Individual or collective priorities whether
based on belief or action
SOCIAL ECOLOGY
Technology
Ideology
Environment Economics
Class Instuons
Race Polics
Gender Behavior
Values Cognion
Figure 2. Socio-ecological factors affecting climate policy
in California.
Within social ecologies, the relative influence and
priority of these elements will be constantly chang-
ing and dependent on the particular times, scales, and
places being analyzed. Race, for example, is a strong con-
stituent of American social ecology that has been over-
looked at times but has re-emerged time and again. Gen-
der was considered relatively little as a dimension of
analysis within most societies until social reform move-
ments gave women the vote and advanced a variety
of feminist histories and social critiques. Dimensions
of social ecologies are often linked to one another. To
take one example, the ideology (one dimension of Fig-
ure 2) of the Republican Party in the United States (an
institution active in the political dimension of Figure 2)
consists in part of denial of climate change (an envi-
ronmental influence within Figure 2) through rhetoric
derived from particular types of cognition and values
(two further dimensions of Figure 2). To put it another
way, the influences between elements of social ecology
move in multiple directions, involve synergies, and are
highly dynamic.
As California’s social ecology evolves, its climate plan-
ning options will change as well. Conversely, successful
policy innovations may change the state’s social ecol-
ogy so as to pave the way for additional breakthroughs.
For example, a growing state identity as a global cli-
mate leader (a combination of “politics,” “values,” “ide-
ology,” and “cognition” in Figure 2) may inspire politi-
cians to take additional steps. For climate mitigation, po-
litical support is perhaps the most relevant product of
social ecology changes. If sufficient political support ex-
ists, far-reaching GHG reduction policies can be adopted.
Conversely, if it doesn’t exist, movement toward carbon
neutrality is unlikely. But other variables are of course
important as well, and many influence politics.
3. California’s Climate Mitigation Planning
California has a long history of actions linked to reduc-
ing GHG emissions, enabled by a relatively favorable
social ecology. The state adopted the first version of
its best-in-nation building energy efficiency standards in
1977, and began studying global warming risks in the
late 1980s. During the 1990s cities such as San Francisco,
San Jose, and SantaMonica initiated sustainable city pro-
grams with a focus on energy conservation. Senate Bill
(SB) 1771 (2000) established the California Climate Ac-
tion Registry, a state-affiliated non-profit agency which
pioneered emissions reporting protocols and allowed in-
stitutions to voluntarily record their emissions. Assem-
bly Bill (AB) 1493 (2002) mandated that vehicles sold in
the state have reduced CO2 emissions, in an effort to get
around the federal government’s unwillingness at that
time to raise fuel efficiency standards for cars and light
trucks. Sixteen other states then adopted the California
standard. This measure required a waiver from the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency; after the George W.
Bush Administration denied this waiver, California sued
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the federal government and eventually won the right to
set such standards.
Although many of these early actions were signifi-
cant in their own right, California’s climate action plan-
ning entered a new, more comprehensive stage in the
mid-2000s. In 2005 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
signed Executive Order S-3-05 setting emissions reduc-
tions targets for several future dates, including 80 per-
cent reductions below 1990 levels by 2050. The follow-
ing year the legislature passed AB 323 directing the pow-
erful CARB to lead planning efforts toward the goal of
lowering GHGs to 1990 levels by 2020. CARB collabo-
rated with other state agencies to form an interagency
working group known as the Climate Action Team, and
by 2008 had approved a list of 40 early action items. Of
these, state officials expected by far the largest GHG re-
ductions fromGHGemissions standards for new vehicles,
increased energy efficiency standards for new appliances
and buildings, a renewable energy portfolio standard re-
quiring utilities to produce 33 percent of electricity from
renewable sources by 2020, reformulated motor vehicle
fuels, and programs to reduce emissions of refrigerants
and other non-CO2 GHGs.
To further reduce GHG emissions from motor vehi-
cles, in 2008 the legislature passed and Schwarzeneg-
ger signed SB 3754 requiring the Air Board to set ve-
hicle miles traveled (VMT) reduction targets in each
of the state’s metropolitan regions. Metropolitan plan-
ning organizations (MPOs) were required to produce Sus-
tainable Community Strategies (SCSs) with spatial de-
velopment and land use policies that would achieve
these reductions. By the early 2010s most had done so,
though in practice these SCSs were simply rebranded Re-
gional Transportation Plans with modest land develop-
ment targets integrated. Local compliance is voluntary
since the MPOs have no statutory authority over land
use. One evaluation found that “very little progress has
been made toward actually changing the regional trans-
portation system and land use patterns” with the result
that “total CO2 emissions increase over time at histori-
cal rates” (Niemeier, Grattet, & Beamish, 2015, p. 1600).
Another analysis concluded that “givenMPOs’ limited re-
sources and authority, the state and federal government
must take on larger roles if outcomes are to change sub-
stantially” (Barbour, 2016, p. 24).
A major strengthening of California’s climate plan-
ning framework took place in 2016 as the AB 32 end-date
of 2020 approached. The strongly Democratic legislature
passed a new bill, SB 32, with a goal of 40 percent re-
ductions below 1990 by 2030, even though the state’s
population was expected to increase about 10 percent
between 2020 and 2030 and its economy was expected
to grow by about 30 percent (Megerian & Dillion, 2016).
CARB set to work in 2017 to develop a scoping plan of
programs to reach the new target, but with the intent of
relying only on existing policy directions.
To provide a broad economic mechanism for emis-
sions reductions, leaders decided early on to adopt a
cap-and-trade program inwhich a gradually lowering cap
would be established on overall emissions and large emit-
ters made to buy or trade for permits. Emitters would
need to reduce cumulative 2013–2020 emissions at least
10 percent compared to business-as-usual projections.
Permit auctions would establish a funding stream use-
ful for other GHG mitigation purposes. Applied to 360
large institutions responsible for 85 percent of the state’s
emissions, this system went into effect in 2013, and an-
nual auction proceeds rose to $1.8 billion in 2015–16.
However, corporate interest declined due to a busi-
ness lawsuit and uncertainties about whether the pro-
gram would be continued beyond 2020. Proceeds fell
and the allowance price hovered around the floor of
$12/ton, a level unlikely to encourage large emissions
reductions. Environmental justice advocates also criti-
cized the program for allowing continued pollution of mi-
nority communities. However, in 2017 with strong sup-
port from Governor Jerry Brown the state legislature ex-
tended the cap-and-trade system through 2030 with a
two-thirds vote.
4. California’s Social Ecology
California has been able to take leadership on climate
planning in large part because of the nature of its social
ecology. Historians such as Starr (2004, 2005) andwriters
such as Didion (1968, 2003) and Davis (1990, 1998) have
provided extensive background on the state’s history and
culture. Here I will focus on the main factors shaping the
state’s ability to initiate climate change planning, refer-
ring back to particular elements within Figure 2.
An initial set of socio-ecology factors relates to the
state’s geographic location and natural environment
(“environment” variables in Figure 2). On the far west-
ern edge of the continent, California is spatially distant
from many eastern and midwestern centers of popu-
lation, separated from them by mountain ranges and
deserts. From the beginning of European settlement it
has been a place apart, a destination for those with in-
dependent spirits ranging from gold rush pioneers to as-
piring filmmakers, dot-com entrepreneurs, and New Age
seekers (thus developing a population with certain dom-
inant values, ideologies, and forms of cognition and be-
havior according to the categories of Figure 2). The re-
sulting diverse, dynamic political culture is more char-
acterized by individualism and moralism than the tradi-
tionalism of many mid-Western and southern U.S. states
(Elazar, 1966/1984).
California’s landscapes are also well-known for their
unique beauty and fragility, and have helped give the
state its identity and environmental sensitivities (more
influence of “environment” variables). Since the nine-
teenth century Californians have rallied to protect old-
3 Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.
4 Sustainable Communities & Climate Protection Act of 2008.
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growth redwoods from logging. In the middle of the
twentieth century they voted to protect much of the
state’s stunning coast from development and oil drilling,
and the legislature enacted environmental review pro-
cesses for development and the nation’s toughest air
quality regulation (in response to Southern California’s
air pollution problems caused in part by geography). The
state’s mild, Mediterranean climate is quite different
from that of most other U.S. regions, contributing to the
state’s identity as a balmy haven from cold and snows,
and its ample sunshine and warm winters greatly facili-
tate prospects for carbon neutral buildings in the future.
Since much of the state is arid or semi-arid, residents
are also highly conscious of the scarcity of water and risk
of drought.
Social factors further distinguish California from the
rest of the U.S. It is the most urban state in the country
(Cox, 2016), and in recent decades has become among
the most diverse. Diversity can play out many different
ways in politics. Much depends on which demographic
groups are involved and what degree of mixing has oc-
curred and for how long. However, a case can be made
thatwithin relatively well-mixed urban regionswhere dif-
ferent types of people live together on a daily basis, di-
versity leads to both tolerance and progressive politics.
Hero (1998, p. 9) distinguishes between homogenous
states, bifurcated states, and heterogenous states; the
latter often verge on “an ethnic or racial polyglot” so-
ciety without the extreme racial divisions of bifurcated
states. He places California within this category. Intoler-
ance and racism have often been present, certainly, and
led to divisive politics throughmuch of the twentieth cen-
tury as the heavily white, Republican state experienced
waves of immigration. However, many parts of the state,
especially urban areas, have now been highly diverse for
generations and have becomemore tolerant (e.g. Talbot,
2012). The state is also known globally for alternative
lifestyles, and “live and let live” valueswhich occasionally
merge into libertarianism. Although a full discussion of
this topic would require more space than we have here,
a case can be made that Figure 2’s dimensions of “race,”
“gender,” “ideology,” “behavior,” and “values” in Califor-
nia have all provided support for tolerance and progres-
sive politics in recent years.
Economically, California, like the rest of the United
States is firmly wedded to laissez-faire capitalism (a com-
bination of “economics,” “politics,” and “ideology” in Fig-
ure 2), and from the gold rush to the dot-com boom has
exemplified the wealth-obsessed, speculative tenden-
cies of that system (influencing “values,” “cognition,” and
“behavior” within this social ecology model). Railroad,
oil, real estate, agribusiness, and construction industries
have produced deeply conservative elites (“class” and
“politics”within Figure 2)who often oppose public sector
efforts to plan and regulate for environmental protection
(Davis, 1990; Starr, 2005; Walker, 2004). Not surprisingly
given this background, the state’s Chamber of Commerce
has litigated the cap-and-trade program, and petrochem-
ical interests including Koch Industries and Valero Energy,
the nation’s largest independent oil refiner, sponsored a
2010 Proposition 23 to suspend the entire AB 32 frame-
work. However, these players are counterbalanced by
film, finance, electronics, internet, media, and clean tech
economic elites, which at times have spent freely to de-
fend and expand the state’s climate leadership. Billion-
aire Tom Steyer for example contributed $5 million to
help defeat Proposition 23, which lost by a wide margin,
61–38 percent (Roosevelt, 2010). At the state level pro-
GHG-reduction economic forces have helped support
GHG reduction efforts so far; at the local and regional lev-
els, especially concerning land development and motor
vehicle infrastructure, business-as-usual interests more
often hold sway.
In terms of “politics” in Figure 2, the state’s his-
tory was conservative or middle-of-the-road for much
of the twentieth century, with a long series of business-
oriented governorships (Starr, 2005). Political reform
movements had only limited success or, as in the case
of the early-twentieth-century good government move-
ment, resulted in reforms like the initiative and referen-
dum process that have at times backfired, being abused
by special interests. Late twentieth-century and early
twenty-first century politics has become more progres-
sive, aided by many strong organizations of civil soci-
ety, but is far from radical. Unions, including ship work-
ers, Pullman porters, farm workers, teachers, and prison
guards, have at times played a significant role but have
not had the same breadth and strength historically as in
the Midwestern U.S.
Institutionally California is also similar to other parts
of the U.S., but with some important differences. As
elsewhere, local government exerts primary control over
land use and economic development, and at least in
terms of suburban expansion is easily captured by pro-
development interests (e.g. Davis, 1990; Pincetl, 2003).
Local capacity to undertake new programs is weak, in
large part due to Proposition 13 in 1978, which reduced
local property taxes by two-thirds andmade local govern-
ments more dependent on development fees and state
funding sources. Regional government is also relatively
weak, as is the case in the U.S. generally, being mainly
focused on distributing funds for transportation and gov-
erned by boards of local elected officials often domi-
nated by conservative suburban and exurban jurisdic-
tions (e.g. Bollens, 1997; Fulton & Shigley, 2012). State
government in contrast has strength in areas such as en-
vironmental protection and transportation, with large,
experienced regulatory agencies.
California has seen strong organizations of civil soci-
ety from relatively early times (“institutions” in Figure 2,
linked in turn to “politics” and “values”). The Sierra Club
got its start in the Bay Area in 1892, and countless other
environmental groups are active within the state. In the
1960s and 70s the human potential movement was par-
ticularly strong in California, with leaders such as psy-
chologist Abraham Maslow and legislator John Vascon-
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cellos. This movement touches upon social ecological di-
mensions of “cognition,” “behavior,” and “values,” and is
linked in turn to liberal politics. From early times social in-
stitutions ranging from the Bohemian Club to the Esalen
Institute have promoted the spread of avant-guard ideas
among a variety of networks. Although many of these
networks have been liberal or progressive, the state has
also been on the cutting edge of conservative ideology
as well. The John Birch society was strong within it in the
early twentieth century; Richard Nixon and Ronald Rea-
gan got their starts in the state; and the modern anti-tax
movement arose in southern California.
Technology (a major force within social ecology) has
played a leading role in California’s social evolution
from the arrival of hydraulic mining and the railroad in
the nineteenth century to the private motor vehicle in
the twentieth and the internet in the twenty-first. Al-
though aerospace, electronics, and semiconductor in-
dustries have transformed the state’s economy in re-
cent generations, perhaps the largest technological in-
fluence upon the state’s social evolution has been com-
munications media. Radio, television, movies, and the
internet were to a large extent pioneered in Califor-
nia, and have helped shape both California and global
society. A century before the rise of electronic media,
William Randolph Hearst’s “yellow journalism” was a
precursor both of later tabloid journalism and of Fox
News and Breitbart. The state’s film, television, and ad-
vertising industries have also helped shape consumptive
lifestyles worldwide.
Overall, California’s values have dovetailed with
other dimensions of its social ecology in recent years
to support climate action planning. To be sure many of
the state’s social values are inconsistent and conflictual.
Individualism and environmentalism, for example, con-
flict when environmental regulations impinge on individ-
ual property owners’ desire to exploit natural resources.
The state also has strong spatial political divisions that
sometimes complicate decision-making. Difficult ques-
tions of behavior change and economic tradeoffs (for ex-
ample more costly consumer goods with a high price on
carbon) have yet to be tackled. But climate policy and
the state’s social ecology have worked relatively well to-
gether to date.
5. The Need to Go Beyond Current Policy Directions
With this background, we can turn to the future pol-
icy challenges California faces in reaching its 2030 and
2050 goals. In 2014 a team from the University of Cali-
fornia, Davis, the University of California, Berkeley, Stan-
ford, and other institutions reviewed nine models of
deep emissions reductions for the state, and warned
that “without new policies, emissions from non-energy
sectors and from high-global-warming-potential gases
may alone exceed California’s 2050 GHG goal” (Morri-
son et al., 2015, p. 546; emphasis original). Yang, Yeh,
Zakerinia, Ramea and McCollum (2015) found the 2050
goal potentially achievable, but only by assuming rapid
adoption of questionable technologies including biofu-
els and carbon capture and sequestration (large-scale
use of biofuels might interfere with food production; car-
bon capture and sequestration has not been shown to
be technically or financially feasible). Greenblatt (2015)
found that none of three modeled scenarios met the
2050 goal, and that only a very strong policy scenario
going well beyond existing initiatives met the 2030 goal.
Yeh et al. (2016) reviewed six leading models, finding
that in order for the state’s 2030 goal to be achieved
new initiatives are needed related to energy efficiency,
renewable electricity, use of biomass for liquid fuels, ag-
gressive adoption of zero emissions vehicles, reduction
in vehicle miles traveled (VMT), and reduction of non-
energy-related GHGs. Although such steps would be diffi-
cult politically, the models showed that these strategies
could bring potential net economic benefit to the state.
Finally, Jones, Greenblatt, Wheeler and Kammen (2017)
and Jones, Wheeler and Kammen (2017) argue that the
state’s existing sector-based GHG accounting leaves out
emissions due to residents’ consumption of goods and
services produced outside the state.
These studies provide evidence that California’s exist-
ing policy directions are inadequate to meet long-term
goals. Several non-academic critiques make the same
point, including Porter (2017), Saha and Muro (2016),
and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2015). The latter study ar-
gues that a global decarbonization rate (decline in the
carbon intensity of economies) of 6.3 percent annually
is necessary to avoid dangerous climate change, and es-
timates California’s decarbonization rate at only around
2 percent.
The targets set by state government, in other words,
go far beyond what current policies can achieve. How-
ever, these policies appear to be at the limit of what the
state’s social ecology will support, as shown by the mid-
2010s legislative struggles to establish 2030 policy and
re-authorize the cap-and-trade system. The climate plan-
ning literature offers little guidance towards addressing
this disconnect, which affects not just California butmost
societiesworldwide. Authors such as Socolow and Pacala
(2005), Brown (2015), and Hawken (2017) present lists of
ambitious strategies that could dramatically reduce GHG
emissions, but fail to address the underlying need for so-
cial ecological changes that could support such policies.
Brinkley (2014) surveys policies in countries with proven
track records of decreasing GHG emissions. However,
none of these countries is anywhere near carbon neutral-
ity. Others such as Bulkeley (2013), Boswell, Greve and
Seale (2012), and the International Council for Local En-
vironmental Initiatives (ICLEI, 2017) discuss more mod-
est and achievable policies at the local government level
to reach short-term goals. Yet these are unlikely to pro-
duce the necessary level of long-term change. In light of
the fundamentally new challenges produced by climate
change planning, Hill (2016) and Wheeler (2010) argue
that new planning approaches are necessary.
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6. A Potential Policy Path to Carbon Neutrality
To address this conundrum, I will first consider what ex-
panded climate mitigation policies might be sufficient
to make California carbon-neutral by mid-century, start-
ing with the highest-emitting economic sectors. These
are summarized in Table 1 below. Then we will turn to
social ecology changes that might make such policies
more feasible.
Transportation is the largest emissions contributor
within California’s existingGHG inventory framework, re-
sponsible for 37 percent of total emissions (CARB, 2017).
Although past state policies requiring reformulated fu-
els and low-emission vehicles plus the post-2008 reces-
sion managed to lower transportation emissions 12 per-
cent between 2000 and 2011, these then stabilized and
edged back up 5 percent by 2017. So new steps are
needed. Two strategies embraced by CARB in its draft
2030 scoping plan and endorsed by many researchers
(e.g. Wei et al., 2013) are to move to an all-electric
fleet with electricity generated from renewable sources
and to adopt policies reducing driving in general. Even
if both were successful, emissions embodied in vehicle
components and production would remain (about 15
percent of the total according to Delucchi, 2005, p. 99).
Carbon sequestration within forests and soils (discussed
later) could help offset those. CARB’s draft 2030 scop-
ing plan has only modest ambitions for reducing trans-
portation emissions, aiming for only a 15 percent re-
duction in light-duty VMT by 2050 and only 4.3 mil-
lion electric vehicles by 2030 out of approximately 15
million. Much stronger policy seems needed. Experts
have proposed steps such as a strong feebate system
(which would levy steep fees on high GHG-emitting ve-
hicles but provide rebates for those with few emissions),
pay-as-you-drive insurance, buy-back programs for high-
emitting older vehicles, and strong state mandates for
better local land use planning that could reduce driving
(e.g. Jones, Wheeler, & Kammen, 2017; Sperling & Eg-
gert, 2014). Carbon fees applied to air tickets and rapid
Table 1. Carbon neutrality policy strategies and obstacles. Emission percentages retrieved from CARB, 2017.
Challenge Potential Strategies Potential Obstacles
Transportation
(37% of
sector-based
emissions)
Vehicle electrification brought about through
feebates, other incentives, strong carbon
pricing, and/or regulation. Better alternative
modes of transport; more compact, balanced
land use; lifestyle change.
Opposition from motor vehicle, petrochemical,
airline, and development interests; local
government opposition to land use
requirements; difficulty of raising funds for
improved transit; difficulty of behavior change.
Industrial
emissions (21%)
Regulation (e.g. building and process
efficiency); strong carbon pricing through
cap-and-trade or carbon tax.
Industrial and political opposition; social equity
concerns over economic burden and allowing
continued pollution of disadvantaged
communities.
Electricity-related
emissions (19%)
Increase renewable portfolio standards to
100%; community choice energy; incentives for
renewables and battery storage within
buildings.
Reluctance of investor-owned utilities to
embrace decentralized renewable energy
systems; developer opposition to ZNE home
requirement.
Non-electric
building emissions
(11%)
Require all-electric buildings and ZNE
construction; require and subsidize upgrades
upon sale of existing buildings.
Building industry opposition; legal and code
barriers; expense and political difficulty of
retrofitting existing buildings.
Agriculture (8%) Increased regulation of the dairy industry and
agriculture; strong carbon pricing; lifestyle
change around diet.
Political opposition from farmers; difficulty of
changing behavior (diets).
High Global
Warming Potential
Gases (4%)
Phase-out following current regulatory trends.
Landfills and
recycling (2%)
Stronger programs to capture methane and
reduce waste.
Funding; behavior change.
Consumption
(out-of-state
products not
counted currently)
Behavior change campaigns; aggressive carbon
pricing extended to consumer products;
regulation to reduce energy use/carbon
content of products.
Economic, political, and cultural opposition;
difficulty of lifestyle change.
Carbon
sequestration
Pursue maximum possible sequestration within
farmland, grassland, and forests.
Farmer and landowner opposition to mandates;
cost; difficulties of managing and verifying
long-term sequestration.
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development of biofuels for aircraft could help reduce
emissions from air travel.
Industry represents California’s second largest source
of emissions, at 21 percent. While the carbon intensity
of the state’s economy (tons of CO2e/million $ GDP)
fell about 28 percent between 2000 and 2015, total
industrial emissions declined only a few percent and
plateaued after 2009 (CARB, 2017). Oil, gas, and hydro-
gen industries are by far the largest industrial sources,
providing further argument for making both vehicles
and buildings all-electric. Emissions for manufacturing
fell in the 2000–2015 period but those for food ser-
vices, rail transportation, aviation, petroleum refining,
landfills, livestock operations, and commercial facilities
rose significantly (CARB, 2017). Thus far the cap-and-
trade system appears to have had only limited influ-
ence. The needed policy direction appears to be a much
higher price on carbon, which could occur either under
a strengthened cap-and-trade system or through a car-
bon tax. High minimum prices on carbon have been pro-
posed by climate activists globally, and were in fact en-
visioned by a 2017 bill introduced into the state Sen-
ate, SB 775, which would have put a minimum price on
carbon of $20/ton, rising by $5 plus inflation each year
while disallowing offsets (Roberts, 2017). However, fac-
ing political opposition and desiring a two-thirds vote
in order to avoid legal challenge under the state consti-
tutional requirement for a 2/3 vote on taxes, Governor
Brown and legislative leaders opted for themilder step of
continuing the current cap-and-trade system with mod-
est improvements.
Electricity generation is the third largest sector of
emissions, comprising 19 percent, and represents the
biggest success story in California’s climate planning to
date. Emissions declined 22 percent between 2000 and
2015 mainly as a result of increases in solar and wind en-
ergy due to renewable energy portfolio standards (CARB,
2017; California Public Utilities Commission, 2016). Re-
newably generated electricity reached 35 percent of the
total in 2015, and the 2030 mandate for 50 percent
should be easily made. The necessary goal would seem
to be 100 percent renewable electricity, with appropri-
ate storage systems to manage supply and demand. Bills
requiring this have been introduced in the legislature
but have failed to pass. The rapid spread of Community
Choice Energy (CCE) programs across the state, through
which cities and counties develop contracts with electric-
ity generators directly on behalf of their residents rather
than going through utilities, is another potential means
to approach 100 percent renewable electricity, since usu-
ally these contracts emphasize renewable energy.
Building energy use—spread across several cate-
gories of the state’s accounting system—is also a large
source of emissions. Non-electricity-related emissions
from commercial and residential buildings accounted for
11 percent of the state’s emissions in 2015. With the
state’s building energy code being strengthened every
three years, new buildings are approaching zero net en-
ergy (ZNE). However, two large barriers to carbon neu-
trality of buildings remain. First, most ZNE buildings use
natural gas for heating, cooking, and/or hot water, with
sufficient solar to offset the energy content of the gas
with renewable power. Yet on a carbon basis the so-
lar panels will progressively offset fewer emissions over
time as the electric grid becomes lower carbon. Plus any
use of natural gas produces direct emissions that are
not in the spirit of carbon neutrality. So the real goal
should be zero net carbon (ZNC), with 100% renewable
energy and no gas. The secondmajor challenge is how to
retrofit the large stock of existing buildings. Past building
retrofit programs have underperformed; a $98 million
California Comprehensive Residential Retrofit program
between 2009 and 2014 reached only 8,100 single-family
homes and 5,700 multifamily units (out of 12 million
housing units in the state) (Metoyer, Gaffney, Hoover, &
Yang, 2014). Some jurisdictions have adopted Property
Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) programs through which
homeowners can pay for energy upgrades through prop-
erty tax surcharges over time rather than upfront pay-
ments. However, residential PACE programs funded only
148,000 energy upgrades nationally in the 2009–2016
period (PACENation 2017), so in their current form these
are not likely to be a solution either. Since voluntary
retrofit programs seem not to be working, one potential
policy direction would be to require and subsidize build-
ing energy efficiency upgrades at time of sale, or within
a mandatory time frame. This would require major state
investment and political support.
Agriculture generates 8 percent of California’s emis-
sions, mainly from methane and nitrous oxide. Dairies
account for 60 percent of agricultural GHGs, an amount
that increased by 23 percent between 2000 and 2015 as
production rose (ARB, 2017). Strong regulation to con-
trol emissions from manure, feed supplements for ru-
minants, and other farm programs can help somewhat
(Hristov et al., 2013). However, the state will probably
need tomandate or incentivize dietary changes, perhaps
through strong carbonpricing of dairy products andmeat
(Wirsenius, Hedenus, & Mohlin, 2011). Major resistance
can be expected.
High Global Warming Potential gases (mainly HFCs
used in air conditioners) account for 4.3 percent of Cal-
ifornia’s emissions. These emissions declined about 44
percent between 2000 and 2015, and existing policy di-
rections seem sufficient to meet long-term goals. Land-
fill (and to a much lesser extent recycling) operations
account for an additional 2 percent of emissions, and
stronger programs to cap landfills and retrieve methane
may be needed. Finally, the state will need to reduce
its residents’ consumption of high-carbon goods and
services produced elsewhere (including air travel). Very
strong new educational and social marketing campaigns
will probably be needed, along with high carbon pricing.
A wild card within California’s carbon accounting is
the potential for carbon sequestration. Programs to store
carbon within soils, trees, or geology can potentially off-
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set some of the state’s emissions. Accelerated research
into these strategies seems called for. However, seques-
tration is unlikely to reduce the need for carbon mitiga-
tion policies such as those above; rather, it may help off-
set unavoidable emissions, for example, those embodied
in motor vehicles and buildings.
7. Future Prospects for the State’s Social Ecology
What can trends in various dimensions of California’s
social ecology tell us about the prospects for such
next-generation climate policies? In terms of the “poli-
tics” and “institutions” dimensions of Figure 2’s model,
prospects are mixed. Climate leaders have been able
to keep the legislative and regulatory process moving
forward to date, but with great effort and multiple
setbacks. Fossil fuel industries successfully derailed a
2016 attempt by Governor Brown to secure a legisla-
tive mandate for a 50 percent reduction in motor ve-
hicle emissions by 2030. They also forced a relatively
weak compromise in terms of reauthorizing the cap-and-
trade framework in 2017. Democratic leaders in the state
Senate had developed the much stronger alternative
mentioned above, SB 775. But hamstrung by the per-
ceived need for a 2/3 vote (an institutional constraint
put in place decades previously by conservative political
forces), Brown and others decided to negotiate a much
weaker bill and gave up many concessions in exchange
for a few Republican votes.
In terms of the “institutions” dimension, other chal-
lenges face the state besides the 2/3 vote requirement.
In California, as inmost other parts of the U.S., electricity
is generated and distributed by investor-owned utilities,
which have primary responsibility to shareholders rather
than the public. Regulation by the state’s Public Utilities
Commission has been weak, and utilities have built un-
necessary fossil fuel-fired power plants and been slow
to support decentralized renewable energy (Penn, 2017).
So changes to energy-providing institutions are proba-
bly needed, either through stronger regulation or public
sector take-over. Another set of institutions, the state’s
metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), manage re-
gional transportation systems and were directed by SB
375 to reducemotor vehicle-related emissions. However,
theseMPOs are frequently dominated bymore conserva-
tive suburban and exurban jurisdictions and have been
unable to implement strong policies for compact, mixed-
use urban development that might reducemotor vehicle
use. The board of the Sacramento Area Council of Gov-
ernments, for example, consists of 26 representatives of
suburban cities and counties and 5 representatives of the
relatively urban jurisdictions of Sacramento, Davis, and
West Sacramento. Although board votes are weighted by
population, these progressive cities represent only about
555,000 out of 2.7 million regional residents, and board
politics is dominated by the suburban jurisdictions. Like
similar entities everywhere else in the U.S. (except Ore-
gon), California’s regional agencies also lack statutory au-
thority over land use, which could help them override lo-
cal zoning codes that keep out affordable housing. Partly
as a result, California’s SB 375 mandate has not been ef-
fective. A stronger land use planning framework seems
needed. Meanwhile, the state’s anti-tax movement of
the 1970s and 1980s has constrained government rev-
enues at state, regional, and local scales, making new
programs difficult and encouraging local governments to
zone for suburban sprawl so as to maximize local tax rev-
enues. This political movement has been based on par-
ticular “values,” “ideology,” and “cognition” within Fig-
ure 2, and arguably is rooted in “race” and “class” dimen-
sions of social ecology through which voters come to be-
lieve that public sector revenues will go to support social
groups different than themselves.
Economic influences (yet another dimension of social
ecology) both hinder and help climate planning. As pre-
viously mentioned, petrochemical interests, the Cham-
ber of Commerce, and other interests associated with
corporate capitalism continue to push back strongly. The
Chamber frequently adds climate-related bills to its an-
nual list of “job killer” legislation, and litigated the cap-
and-trade system for much of the 2010s. However, Cal-
ifornia’s economy has done relatively well despite the
Chamber’s predictions of doom, even leading the na-
tion in GDP growth in 2015 (Hiltzik, 2016). Silicon Val-
ley and Hollywood are two economic dynamos many
of whose leaders support climate planning. The state’s
rapidly growing clean tech industriesmay tilt the balance
toward support for climate action in the future. In 2015
California generated more than 25 percent of all energy
efficiency patents in the US and received 68 percent of
total U.S. clean tech investment (Next 10, 2016); in 2016
clean energy alone accounted for 508,000 jobs in the
state (Roosevelt, 2016). As such green economic forces
expand, their ability to influence state climate policy is
likely to increase. Whether this economic force can be
mobilized politically remains to be seen.
In terms of the “technology” dimension of social ecol-
ogy, California is well-known as a global center of inno-
vation and technological change, which can in turn in-
fluence GHG emissions (by developing low-carbon tech-
nologies) and political and institutional dimensions of
social ecology (by allowing policy innovation). For ex-
ample, home storage batteries such as Tesla’s Power-
Wall, introduced in 2015, could greatly reduce the state’s
need for imported electricity if they allow homes to store
their afternoon surplus of photovoltaic-generated elec-
tricity for evening use. California companies such as Tesla,
Google, and Apple are also pioneering autonomous and
electric vehicles that have the potential to reduce GHGs
from vehicle ownership and driving. However, success-
ful adoption of such technologies is highly dependent on
institutions adopting effective incentives and regulation.
Meanwhile, an overemphasis on technology as the main
source of solutions to climate change can have negative
results, such as distracting attention from the need for
institutional, political, and lifestyle reforms.
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Social movements (combining social ecology dimen-
sions such as “values,” “ideology,” and “politics” within
Figure 2) within California could also support reducing
emissions, and are likely to further build the state’s
identity as a climate leader and model of progressive
politics. Elected officials have positioned California as
a national and global leader in opposition to conser-
vative national politics, and civil society organizations
such as Move On, Equality California, and the nation’s
largest chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union
have helped organize this resistance. In otherwaysmove-
ments for environmental justice, bicycle activism, LGBT
empowerment, and farmworker safety hold positive im-
plications for climate change planning, for example by
advocating reduced pollution and alternative lifestyles.
Environmental justice movements have played a major
role to date in supporting climate planning but insist
that equity considerations be included (London et al.,
2013; Mendez, 2015). However, growing inequality of
wealth and power (“class” in Figure 2) works against cli-
mate progress within California as within the nation as
a whole. Members of disempowered communities of-
ten withdraw from civic engagement and hold resent-
ments that can be harnessed by populist right-wing politi-
cians. Meanwhile, stakeholders on the winning end of in-
equality often see little reason to seek common solutions
to problems, instead withdrawing into their entitled en-
claves. Along this line Holmberg (2017) argues that high
social inequality works against climate solutions by pro-
moting short-term personal and corporate profit maxi-
mization rather than longer-term collective values.
A major challenge for the state has to do with
the “behavior” dimension of social ecology. California
for many decades has exemplified high-consumption,
motor-vehicle-oriented American lifestyles. These pref-
erences combine with a hands-off approach to lifestyle
questions will make carbon neutrality difficult. However,
there are signs that lifestyles are changing for at least
some residents. Relative to the generation before, the
state’s Millennials (like those in many other parts of the
world) live in more urban locations, own motor vehicles
at lower rates, and more frequently walk, bike, carpool,
and use on-demand services such as Uber and Lyft (Cir-
cella et al., 2016, 2017). Although Millennials’ vehicle
ownership is expected to rise as they age and start fami-
lies, their current behavior may lead to lower long-term
vehicle use and willingness to live in smaller, more urban
dwellings. Economic factors such as the loss of manufac-
turing jobs, the rise of contingent employment, and high
real estate prices may also encourage behavioral evolu-
tion. Such changes may at least in part counterbalance
traditionally consumptive behavior.
The most hopeful social ecology trend for California’s
climate planning has to do with racial diversity (“race” in
Figure 2). Future demographic trends appear strongly pos-
itive for progressive politics, as shown in Tables 2 and 3.
Over the past 50 years the state’s steady progress
toward greater diversity has correlated remarkably
well with increasingly progressive politics. Democrats
have controlled both houses of the state’s legislature
since 1992 with the exception of the Assembly during
1994–1996. The state does not feature the strongly parti-
san gerrymandering of legislative districts found in many
other U.S. states, and indeed approved ballot initiatives
in 2008 and 2010 to set legislative and congressional dis-
tricts through a nonpartisan Citizens Redistricting Com-
mission, a significant reform to the “institutions” dimen-
sion of the state’s social ecology. Despite the climate de-
nial stance of the national Republican Party, the state’s
most recent Republican governor, Arnold Schwarzeneg-
ger, earned a reputation as a strong climate action cham-
pion. Greenhouse gas reductions are closely correlated
with local air quality improvements, a top concern of
many state constituencies including the state’s medical
establishment and Latino organizations.
8. Conclusion: Evolving California’s Social Ecology
Wehave seen thatwithin California’s social ecology there
are factors supporting strong climate action but also sig-
Table 2. Changing California Demographics (%). Source: California Department of Finance. California’s population has be-
come far more diverse since 1970, with the trend projected to continue through at least 2030.
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 (p) 2030 (p)
White 77 67 57 47 40 38 36
Black 7 7 7 7 6 6 6
Hispanic 12 19 26 32 38 40 42
Asian/Pacific Islander 3 5 9 12 13 13 13
Native American 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Table 3. California Presidential Voting (%). Source: LA Times. At the same time the state’s electorate has become far more
Democratic as shown by its voting in Presidential election.
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
Democrat 36 41 48 46 51 54 54 61 60 62
Republican 53 58 51 33 38 42 44 37 37 32
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nificant countervailing forces. Particularly promising are
the state’s progress toward greater social diversity and
progressive politics (“race” and “politics” dimensions of
Figure 2), its institutional strength around environmen-
tal policy and regulation (“institutions”), its recent im-
provements to democratic institutions such as redistrict-
ing (also “institutions”), its culture of innovation (“tech-
nology,” “cognition,” and “economics”), its progressive
identity (“ideology” and “cognition”), and its growing
environmentally related economic sectors (“economics”
and “politics”). Particularly challenging are institutional
constraints on public sector capacity, the continued polit-
ical power of fossil fuel industries and other conservative
economic forces, growing social inequality, and highly
consumptive lifestyles (forces within the “institutions,”
“politics,” “class,” “ideology,” and “behavior” dimensions
of social ecology).
A number of near-term strategic moves might
strengthen the state’s social ecology in terms of climate
and sustainability planning. To start with, a high and in-
creasing price on carbon (an “economic” initiative within
Figure 2), in addition to directly discouraging fossil fuel
use, would have ripple effects throughout California’s
social ecology, encouraging technology and behavior
change. Strengthening the state’s cap-and-trade system
or adopting a direct carbon tax will likely be needed to
produce such pricing.
Overhauling the state’s tax system (an important “in-
stitution” within Figure 2) would be another positive in-
fluence on social ecology, increasing public sector capac-
ity to deal with challenges such as achieving carbon neu-
trality. Specific steps might include eliminating Proposi-
tion 13 constraints on property taxes and the two-thirds
requirements for tax increases. Such changes could be
phased in if necessary. Regional tax base sharing could
also discourage high-GHG types of suburban and exur-
ban development while improving social equity (Chap-
ple, 2016). A severance tax on oil and gas production
could produce revenue for GHG reduction programs and
help change behavior (unlike other oil producing states,
California currently has no such tax). Since these changes
won’t be easy, strong leadership (“politics” in Figure 2)
would be needed to make the case to the public for
such changes.
A stronger framework of climate planning incentives,
mandates, and technical support between levels of gov-
ernment is another potential “institutional” step. One of
the lessons from Oregon, the nation’s leader in terms of
urban growth management, is that such a framework of
governance can produce more successful results than if
any single level of government acted alone. The State
of Oregon established 19 Statewide Planning Goals in
1973, and since that time hasworkedwith lower levels of
government to facilitate local implementation (Wheeler,
2000). Maryland has employed similar strategies under
its smart growth framework beginning in 1998 (Hanlon,
Howland, & McGuire, 2010; Shen & Zhang, 2007). Revi-
sions to California’s SB 375 framework could follow this
model by setting stronger GHG reduction goals related
to transportation, housing, and consumption, providing
more extensive state support and funding to local gov-
ernments, and conditioning local receipt of state infras-
tructure funds on compliance with state GHG-reduction
goals.Making regional planning agencies directly elected
and giving them power to approve large development
projects and review local zoning codes could also help.
Meanwhile, state funding for affordable housing and
mandates that local governments zone for it could re-
duce GHGs and social inequities by ensuring sufficient af-
fordable housing near workplaces. The state legislature
took initial steps in this direction in 2017.
Evolving “values,” “cognition,” and “behavior” within
Figure 2 is perhaps the largest challenge of all. Arguably
such change has already occurred within American soci-
etywith regard to issues such as smoking, civil rights, and
gay rights. Those changes typically required goal-setting
by high levels of government as well as massive inter-
vention through legal, educational, and public health sys-
tems. In addition to the other strategies mentioned ear-
lier, a great deal of research now exists on effective com-
munication methods around climate change (a “technol-
ogy” of spreading information so as to change “behav-
ior”), particularly to help overcome individuals’ defenses
against depressing science or lifestyle change. Moser
(2016) provides an overview of climate change commu-
nication, and Stern et al. (2016) review the potential of
behavior change for households and organizations. The
State of California will likely need to lead new educa-
tional efforts on this front. Previous campaigns on smok-
ing, drunk driving, healthy eating, and the like may pro-
vide models.
In order to bring such social ecology changes about,
planners and other professionals will need to articulate
the need for them and help the public understand how
such fundamental reforms are crucial tomaking progress
on climate planning, social equity planning, and other im-
portant sustainability needs (to use the language of the
model, planners can use communication “technology” to
help change “cognition,” “values,” “ideology,” “politics,”
and “institutions”). Public debates often focus on a few,
limited policies. However, emphasizing the big picture
of how the state can move towards carbon neutrality in
2050 (a particular communications approach) may help
the public and decision-makers see how such change can
come about. To put it anotherway, planners need to com-
bine systems thinking with advocacy planning.
Although this discussion has focused on California, ju-
risdictions worldwide face similar needs to shape their
social ecologies so as to support climate action or sus-
tainability generally. Existing social ecologies rarely sup-
port the level of action required. The needs in any given
place will depend on context, but the process will be sim-
ilar. Planners can identify both policies that can directly
address the problem in the long term, and underlying so-
cial ecology changes that can increase the chances of suc-
cessful action. Bringing about change on both levels will
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not be easy, but in a world in which political polarization
and dysfunction are increasingly common, such strategic
thinking related to social ecology is crucial.
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